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This essay began as a paper for a day of critical reflection, drawing on three sources 
- promotional material for 'Social Enterprise Day' in November 2006, the 'Social 
Enterprise Awards' in the same month, and ministerial statements - to illustrate some 
observations about a dominant view of social enterprise. The purpose of making this 
essay  public in 2011is not simply to  record a worry about the direction of an aspect 
of social policy in the United Kingdom during the second and third terms of the New 
Labour government (from 2001 onwards), but also to draw attention to the continuing 
relevance of the worry. 
 
The aspect of social policy I am concerned about is the role of independent not-for-
profit organisations in general, and specifically those seeing themselves - and/or 
seen by others - as 'social enterprises'.  The ground on which I stand has three 
features:  
 
First, in my professional role, a conscious espousal of a broadly Popperian approach 
to policies and institutions, deriving from two decades of working with the Centre for 
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Institutional Studies (at the University of East London); this treats policies and 
institutions as attempts to solve serious social problems, and asks both how effective 
they are, and - especially where effectiveness is in doubt - how well the problems 
have been formulated with the intention of improving the formulation of the problem, 
and thus the policy or institution. It  should be emphasised that this is an approach, 
not a method; we don’t (and can’t) expect to know in advance exactly how to 
examine any given problem, or attempted solution, because situations vary, but we 
can and do know that we want to start with a formulation of a problem – whether our 
own, or someone else’s,  My other work, over the same period  -as an independent 
consultant to, trainer with, and researcher on, not for profit organisations generically - 
has not always followed this approach, but recalling the approach  has often proved 
useful when stuck. 
 
Second, a still-evolving view of myself as a citizen (even if formally a subject) in a 
relatively free and relatively democratic state, I share with others an interest in how 
the social, economic and political worlds are organised, in the roles played by 
government, and in how taxes are spent. 
 
Third, a similarly still-evolving experience of myself as a person, who is disturbed 
and distressed by inexplicable behaviour in others, and in particular by incongruities; 
for example, between words and actions, and at another level, between party 
principles and government programmes. 
 
Three arguments 
 
For a worry to be allowed to influence theory or practice, it requires justification: this 
is attempted in the form of three inter-related arguments about not-for-profit 
organisations in general, about New Labour, and about social enterprise. These 
arguments are that not-for-profit organisations have tried before to resolve the 
dilemmas experienced today by social enterprises; that the early New Labour 
interest in the 'Third Way' was misconceived; and that this  misconception has now 
found its ideal vehicle in a notion about 'social enterprise'. If these arguments are 
reasonable, then worry about the consequences may be justified, and it behoves 
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commentators, as well as practitioners, managers, and policy makers, to keep them 
under review. 
 
Managing voluntary organisations 
 
In 1981, two years after Margaret Thatcher's first election victory, and at about the 
same time as the 'gang of four' created the Social Democratic Party, moves were 
afoot to transform the voluntary sector in Britain. A working party chaired by Charles 
Handy, and serviced by Nicholas Hinton, then Director of the National Council of 
Voluntary Organisations, produced a report on improving the effectiveness of 
voluntary organisations (NCVO, 1981)). 
 
The analysis was challenging for the sector: it was that there were two types of 
problem faced by voluntary organisation; first level, which can be solved by relatively 
straightforward technical improvements, and second level - such as organisation 
purpose, conflicts, and change - which need wrestling with in a different way. The 
report observed that organisations tried to solve both types of problem as if they 
were the same.  
 
It recommended, among other things, that the National Council provide better help to 
its member organisations with both levels of problem, and the management 
development unit was duly set up. I entered this scene as a prospective consultant, 
and an escapee from battles in Oxfam about just the kind of second level problems 
the report identified.  
 
In discussions in this field at the time, a search for a third way could be construed: 
between the abject certainties of the managerialist tendency and the equally abject 
romanticism of its anti-managerialist foes, elements of such a third way were, for me, 
to be found, for example, in the systems of supervision established in some parts of 
the social care field, in the trenchant insistence on discussing the undiscussable in 
the work of Chris Argyris, and in the situational logic of Karl Popper (for example, 
Argyris, 1980; Popper, 1976).  
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While (as I and others discovered) a definitive third way could be constructed out of 
such preferred theories or practices, this would miss the point. The power of the idea 
of a third way is that it does not mean following fixed plans, it is a course resorted to 
in the event of the failure of both plan A and plan B: a third way can be one of an 
infinite number of different strategies. But if there was a common characteristic, it lay 
in adopting ways of talking about what was happening inside organisations which 
neither treated problems as insoluble, nor which treated the solutions as obvious. 
 
For example: in the context of a community or voluntary organisation facing a 
financial difficulty, plan A might be extra fundraising effort, plan B cutting staff; a third 
way solution would involve, first, key people acknowledging that neither plan A or 
plan B is good enough in itself, and probably not even in combination. In such 
situations, anecdotally, a small group of people meets at someone's kitchen table, 
finds it hard to know what to do next, and gets exasperated; it is in this unpromising 
setting that third ways emerge - not simply alternative solutions of the same type,  
but alternative ways of seeing the problem, and alternative ways of formulating 
solutions; in this case, say, merger, renegotiation of the terms of employment, 
changing patterns of delivery, borrowing, rescheduling existing debt, or any of these 
in combination; the pursuit of the third way will be, in part at least, a matter of 
process, rather than the easy production of a policy package, a plan C 
indistinguishable in form from a plan A or a plan B. 
 
In this approach to problem-solving (however consciously or otherwise people take 
it) there is at least tacit respect for the seriousness of the problem, and the degree to 
which the problem challenges the normal habits of the organisation.  
 
New Labour's Third Way 
 
New Labour's third way was not like this; it was more of a fixed policy of striking 
balances between plan A and plan B, the first sector and the second sector, the state 
and the market (or 'neither Washington nor Moscow'). It offered little advance 
conceptually on the formulae of the Social Democrat Party, except that some of its 
constituent balancing acts were now more precisely articulated: 
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 crime and the causes of crime 
 
 rights and responsibilities 
 
 public and private partnerships 
 
In dialectical terms, this third way represents, if not 'the end of history', then the end 
of synthesis; but the New Labour interpretation of the idea was always hard to nail 
down - interviewers tried without much success with leading proponents, notably 
Tony Blair himself, before and after the 1997 general election - though he claimed in 
1998 to be 'very very clear' about 'a principled position which is also entirely sensible' 
(Kettle 1998, quoted in Howlett and Locke 1999); and it has not been much 
discussed in recent years by politicians or commentators, at least not in explicit 
terms.  
 
It is argued for the purposes of this paper, however, that a received version 
emerged; through its deployment by politicians, and the commentary of others, the 
idea of the third way was turned from being a potentially flexible conceptual tool into 
a prescription for consensual policy. In this view, the most emblematic outcome of 
governmental third way thinking is to be found in the continually - but never 
significantly - revised proposals for the composition of the second chamber (part-
elected, and part-appointed);  this marks the idea as associated with others, such as 
'middle England', 'Mondeo Man' and 'Worcester Woman', all of which implicated in a 
more shadowy idea about the need for the British Labour Party in particular - and 
perhaps social democratic parties in general - to provide political reassurance to 
sections of the electorate by distancing themselves from aspects of their own 
traditions. 
 
Some connections are evident: in 1999, Tony Blair asserted  
 
‘Government and community need each other (...) That is why the Third 
Sector is such an important part of the Third Way’ (NCVO, 1999)) 
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Howlett and Locke (1999), commenting on the implications of this view for the 
government's volunteering policy, note that:  
 
‘He talked of 'millions of people making millions of decisions', of voluntary and 
community organisations in the plural, and occasionally of 'communities', but 
he emphasised common purpose and 'the community' in the singular’ (Howlett 
and Locke 1999). 
 
This could be construed as a warning. 
 
Social enterprise: the third way re-invented 
‘In my view, social enterprise is the new British business success story, 
forging a new frontier of enterprise – a quiet revolution involving 55,000 social 
enterprises in our country from the smallest community groups to larger 
businesses’ (Gordon Brown, Cabinet Office website) 
Amid disagreement about definitions, as there has been about social enterprise in 
the UK, a shape nevertheless comes into view and hardens. The ominant idea of 
social enterprise in the UK (rather than the practice) could be mistaken for the child 
of New Labour's third way aspirations.  The aspirations have not, as noted above, 
come to much elsewhere, but in social enterprise there is a policy vehicle through 
which the aspirations may be given full expression: 
 
‘In spite of well known success stories like The Eden Project, The  Big Issue 
or Jamie Oliver's Fifteen, only one in four people know what a social 
enterprise is: a firm founded for a social purpose that reinvests its profits in 
the company or community’ (Cabinet Office website) 
 
The usefulness of the idea of social enterprise to government lies mainly in another 
component idea embedded within it, the double-bottom line; the idea of the double-
bottom line has impressive explanatory power (and exhortatory power for 
practitioners), (see eg Clarke et al 2004) but it can also be adopted as a device for 
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carrying or legitimising other policy intentions and approaches - by Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats as well as by Labour politicians. 
 
The double-bottom line promises the solution of a range of 'wicked' public policy 
problems (see APSC, 2007) by methods which themselves, in turn, constitute a 
solution to another set of social problems (in employment, engagement, 
empowerment), as well as a solution to fiscal problems (because social enterprise 
means savings in state spending). 
 
The extent to which this is welcome is evident in what politicians and the government 
say: 
 
‘Britain's social entrepreneurs: dynamic and innovative, with a profound sense of 
social justice’ (Ed Miliband, Social Enterprise Day website) 
 
‘Business dynamism and success with fairness and social justice’ 
(Gordon Brown, Action Plan,'Scaling New Heights', quoted in the Cabinet Office 
website) 
 
‘Social enterprises not only tackle some of society's most entrenched social and 
environmental challenges – they increase levels of enterprise and attract new 
people to business, catalyse and respond to growing ethical markets, and 
challenge the private sector to put social justice alongside profit-making at the 
heart of what they do’ (Cabinet Office website) 
 
 
But as well as the specific benefits of the double-bottom line, the surrounding 
concept is as welcome for its confirmation of cherished traditions - mutualism, 
voluntarism, entrepreneurship, and above all for its (finalising) synthesis of these 
traditions into a single, harmonious project, consistent with the  third way, with social 
democracy, and perhaps even with the widely-sought sense of nationhood. 
 
But social enterprise famously has many forebears, and individual social enterprises 
have a range of origins: co-operatives, conventional businesses with enlightened 
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attitudes, informal associations, divested units of government, community groups, 
campaigns for fairer trade, ethical investment houses, reformed philanthropic 
institutions, charities with changed strategies, and so on. 
 
Isomorphism in social enterprise: a historical digression 
 
The tendency to isomorphism, of whatever kind, is not in itself a disaster. There is, in 
this field as in others, a market-place of ideas about what organisations should do, 
and how they should do it, as much as there is a market-place for goods and 
services; so it is to be expected that rules, admiration of success, and other factors, 
will produce isomorphism among social enterprises as elsewhere. 
 
Some of the elements of this situation, however, produce a special risk of 
normativity: intense competition between political parties for the centre ground, 
particularly in economic policies; several years of significantly increased investment 
in public services, followed by widespread and growing frustration about the 
outcomes; the appearance on social and economic scene of apparently innovative 
mechanisms of delivery, bolstered by the invention of new legal structures; and the 
emergence of high-profile success stories, leaders, champions, and advocates: 
 
‘Social Enterprises are having an incredible impact across the UK  – from 
tackling social exclusion to providing opportunities for  the young to help 
shape our communities’ (Hilary Armstrong, Cabinet Office website) 
 
...’we will witness a fantastic flowering of social enterprise, the like of which 
we cannot even imagine today’ (David Cameron, Scarman lecture) 
 
No-one who matters disagrees - business schools, faith organisations, and princes 
all echo this confidence. 
 
Yet social enterprise, as a singular and unitary phenomenon, is a travesty of a 
complex history. Different social enterprises come from not only different traditions, 
but opposing traditions; some from labour organising itself against its previous 
relationship with capital, others from capital exploiting its relationship with labour; 
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some from breaking established loyalties, others from reasserting them; some from 
binding means and ends, others from splitting them. 
 
Specifically in the history of community and voluntary organisations in the UK, there 
are organisations for whom trading is new and those for whom it is not, and there 
have long been contentions within (and sometimes between) trading charities about 
the implications of their trading activities. 
 
The history, then, is of over-lapping market-places of ideas about social problems 
and their solutions, about policies, strategies and practices, and about the roles and 
relationships of different actors. This can mean more than mere competition in a 
conventional market-place for goods or services, it can mean conflicts between 
them: a politicised customer of a Co-operative food outlet may, for example, have 
the same objection to a new store in the area, whether it is built by Tesco or 
Waitrose, regardless of the fact that the latter is supposed by some to belong to the 
same broad category of social enterprise as the Co-operative itself. 
 
Proponents of the emerging dominant view of social enterprise may not know about 
the divergent histories of category members, or they may believe that these 
divergent histories are of limited importance; but in relation to the promise they have 
for policy, there is a telling resemblance between apparently different positions: 
 
‘We must have diversity of provision to ensure government,  business and the 
third sector – particularly social enterprise – all  play their part in reshaping our 
public services’ (Hilary Armstrong, Cabinet Office website) 
 
‘I will never pretend that the big shift from state to society can be achieved 
overnight. But I am supremely confident that as we allow communities to take 
over responsibilities for their own neighbourhoods…as we change the funding 
system to reward creativity and innovation…we will witness a fantastic 
flowering of social enterprise.’ (David Cameron, Scarman lecture website) 
 
For the government minister, the importance of diversity of provision was itself 
acknowledged, and the special place of social enterprise in ensuring diversity is 
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recognised - but for a single ultimate purpose of reshaping 'our' services, and an 
intermediate one of keeping all in step. The then leader of the opposition, David 
Cameron,  emphasises  his policy differences from the government in seeking 
freedom for the local, but, like the minister, sees social enterprise as a unitary whole, 
falling into place with a (centrally determined) policy of localisation. 
 
The wish by politicians or others to co-opt independent organisations into a 
normative model of social enterprise would only be a cause for concern if it were met 
with little resistance by social enterprises themselves, and of course social 
enterprises respond variably. However, it has been one marker of prominent social 
enterprises, unsurprisingly, that they eschew adversarialism - the widely-espoused 
double-bottom line represents a desire for balance between hitherto allegedly 
competing principles. Thus some social enterprises - especially those drawn to the 
centre-ground - may be pre-disposed to compliance with a dominant model, 
whatever form it takes. 
 
The room for argument 
 
Where does debate take place about the roles of third sector organisations and in 
particular their relationships with government?  In his 2006 Hinton lecture, 
government minister Ed Miliband quoted the late Nick Hinton: 
 
‘To change things in Britain you should think radical thoughts and wear a dark 
suit’  
 
and added later 
 
‘If I may say so, I think the central insight I have seen is that you have 
enormous power when you work together’ 
 
The hidden message could not be more clearly visible. 
 
While social enterprises may work together, they must also work separately - like 
community and voluntary organisations generically - if they are to express their 
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different traditions and interests. This suggests a need for public debate between 
them on occasions, but this is difficult to countenance - as it is for many charities - 
because of the possible cost to their reputations: social enterprises, with their 
commitment to a double-bottom line, and to third way solutions to persistent social 
problems, are unlikely to risk undermining their own hard-won credibility by resorting 
to antagonistic public exchanges with others. 
 
The implications are disturbing: social enterprises share a high degree of confidence 
with their supporters about their ability to deliver solutions to problems, yet some of 
them show less confidence in debating their roles and relationships. They are 
effective agents, but some are not necessarily effective participants in democracy. 
This may be a matter of policy choice - which would also be disturbing but in some 
cases, social enterprises may be relatively ill-equipped for public debate because 
there is no training internally. 
 
If social enterprises are an important part of the democratic system -  as some of the 
politicians quoted here imply - and not just part of a delivery system, then they must 
be capable of cultivating debate, so that arguments are rehearsed internally, even if 
unresolved, before being tested with competitors in the market-place of ideas. 
 
Both levels of debate, internal and public, are in danger of being closed down in an 
isomorphised, unitary, social enterprise field, where everyone is on the same side 
because all share the same ultimate goal. In an atmosphere where ends justify 
means, it will be harder for the Co-op to make a case against Waitrose (or for 
Waitrose to make its case against the Co-op) even though this is vital in a free 
market where customers and investors are supposed to have common access to 
information about all options and their consequences. However public debate is self-
evidently risky and internal debate presents difficulties to managements and 
company loyalists. 
 
Ed Miliband, later in the Hinton Lecture, said: 
 
‘I happen to disagree with Iain Duncan Smith...“if everybody comes together for 
one movement you get only one concept prevailing and it locks out alternative 
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thinking". Actually, I think that is how political change happens: from a unified 
voice’  
 
Social enterprise solved two problems at once for a government which had lost its 
(third) way. It 'delivers' a new stream of entrepreneurship in a country where making 
things is a lost art, whilst targeting some of the people and places whose needs the 
state most struggles to meet. Its promise would turn out to be just as welcome to 
New Labour’s successor administration. 
 
But one of the costs of the solution has been clearly set out: a unified voice on the 
part of the sector; that it should become what it at present is not. 
 
Conclusion: disaster or dissent 
 
Argyris (for example Argyris 1980) showed how something becomes undiscussable 
when discussion of it would cause embarrassment to one or more of the people 
involved - so they agree not to embarrass each other.  
 
It was, for example, possible to discuss, in many settings in the UK in late 2006, how 
to produce more 'community cohesion', but not, in some of those settings, whether 
more community cohesion was desirable or not; and it was difficult to start a 
discussion with the proposition that there should be less community cohesion. 
Similarly with 'rights and responsibilities': how they might be balanced was 
discussable but not the proposition that it would be better to divorce them because 
there is no correspondence between them. 
 
An aspect of social enterprises which is in danger of becoming undiscussable, in the 
same sense, is their necessarily infinite variety, the contests between them, and the 
contests within them.  
 
Social enterprises cannot solve the problems which democratic politics has evolved 
to deal with; they can aid understanding of these problems by drawing attention to 
aspects of them - such as specific failures in the state or the market - and even 
enrich debates about them, but political choices still have to be made in democratic 
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arenas. For social enterprises to make a useful contribution, they need to be places 
of debate between both themselves and within themselves; if they are not, they will 
become, one by one, dismal places to work and as a sector, they will become 
discredited and fatally over-associated with the obsessive centre ground politics of a 
particular period: consensual corporate social responsibility for the nation, in 
voluntarist form. 
 
The potential disaster is not so much for social enterprises themselves, some of 
which will survive and carry on their work, however reconfigured, but for the way 
social policy is thought about and made in the UK.  
 
The dominant model of social enterprise is the continuation of some mainly very old 
ideas about the social world, the world of enterprise, and their manageability. The 
unanimity of enthusiasm for an uncontroversial view of social enterprise across the 
formal political spectrum adds to the risk of its adoption for some time, and the 
marginalisation of dissenting institutional solutions to social problems: 
 
‘I want to suggest how the model of engagement between state and sector 
can be strengthened...how the different strengths of  the state and the third 
sector can better enable people to change society...I want to say something 
about how state and sector need to change as a result’ (Ed Miliband, Hinton 
lecture) 
 
The Third Way was a potentially creative idea about solving a problem (of 
adversarialism) in the political arena which became fossilised into a pre-emptive 
creed - and the scope for using it in policy-making shrunk. In contrast, social 
enterprises have constituted, over centuries, a range of attempts to solve problems 
in social and economic arenas - many good ideas rather than one - which now risk 
being reconceived as a unitary solution. It is unclear how far debate about this 
development is happening within or between social enterprises; but depoliticisation 
of the problems (for the sake of a unitary solution) risks discrediting formerly plural 
strategies, and eliminating critical appraisal of each of them on its merits. The threat 
is to how we think. 
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A repoliticised, rather than depoliticised, social enterprise field might have some of 
the following characteristics: 
 
 public discussion of fundamental policy, management, and  practice 
dilemmas, both within individual enterprises, and in fora where social 
enterprises meet 
 
 stakeholders abandoning organisations because of unacceptable 
compromises to explicit or implicit principles 
 
 the formation of new coalitions or alliances (even if only temporary, or about 
single issues) in opposition to those already established 
 
 public reports of adverse consequences and their origins 
 
These are phenomena which would be widely unwelcome in many settings: they 
would be perceived as undermining the business of business, or the enterprise of 
enterprise - but this is social. 
 
The problems which social enterprises try to solve are various; this means that social 
enterprises must themselves be various - in structure, form, ownership, constitution, 
policy, management, practice, attitude, shape, style, culture, politics and theory, to 
name but the most obvious; it is hard to see, then, how they could be in perpetual 
agreement with each other; some may choose to minimise their competitive 
encounters with other social enterprises, but even this cannot be expected across 
the whole population. 
 
If the social claims made of and for social enterprises are to stand up, and if they are 
plural rather than unitary, then at least some of them will express dissent, or contain 
dissent, or reflect dissent. It remains to be seen how far social enterprises, and their 
supporters across the party political spectrum, even in government, are open to 
plurality, and the dissent that goes with it; and how far their own joint worries about 
performance, delivery, and accountability moves them in a different direction. 
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In my professional role, I acknowledge the impressionistic nature of some of these 
comments, and also that the analysis is of what is being said rather than what is 
being done: social enterprises may be fighting daily and assertively with branches of 
government, out of the sight of observers; as a citizen, I want to know more about 
this, if it happening; as a person, I object to not being told. 
 
  
 
Note 
In November 2006, Ed Miliband, Hilary Armstrong and Gordon Brown were all 
leading ministers in the UK's Labour government; David Cameron was the leader of 
the official opposition party, the Conservatives. 
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